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Mr. Proctor
Mr. Smith

TO: Mr. Eisenbeiss

DATE: 13 Sept 1968

FROM: Karl

SUBJECT: Report on CIA
Material in the White House and
in Presidential Libraries

REMARKS:

This is a most interesting report
based on Hugh's recent talk with Art
McCafferty.

It is unmistakably clear that a
very large quantity of Agency material
now in the White House is destined
for the Johnson Library. It is also
clear that the White House has no
effective control system and has only
a general idea what it has.

Strongly recommend reading Hugh's
5-page covering memo.

*a look at the attachment on
W.H. files re Vietnam is frightening*

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Shirley - Yes - ~~file~~ in Presidential Library

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9 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: CIA Materials in the White House and in
Presidential Libraries

1. Here is a summary of a 90-minute conversation I had on 5 September with Mr. Arthur McCafferty, the staff officer of the National Security Council who is responsible for maintaining the vault which contains all material in the White House on foreign affairs, national security, and intelligence.
2. Everything in the vault is scheduled to be shipped to Austin for inclusion in the special classified section of the Johnson Library. This practice was followed in assembling the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy Libraries. Even though CIA made no specific contributions to either the Truman or Eisenhower Library as such, Mr. McCafferty said "you would be absolutely astounded to know how much CIA material is in them. I think you can take it for granted that every goddam piece of paper ever sent to Mr. Eisenhower by CIA is in the Eisenhower Library. There are probably two full safes of material in the Kennedy Library devoted to the missile crisis, and this certainly includes material provided by CIA."
3. At 5 o'clock on the afternoon of the assassination in 1963, the roadway outside the entrance to the West Wing was piled high with boxes from the vault to be shipped to the Kennedy Library. This will be true again on 19 January 1969. (And it raises the question whether CIA should try to obtain permission to inspect and catalogue the CIA materials already in the various presidential libraries. The White House filing system by which documents are filed according to general subject only, and not by origin, would make this an exceedingly large task.) The decision as to what papers in the foreign and security fields will be made available to the next administration is to be made by Walt Rostow and McCafferty implied that this is a matter of pressing unfinished business.
4. At the same time McCafferty emphasized that the Government's laws and regulations applying to the handling of classified material are binding on the Presidential Library and will continue to be until such material is specifically declassified, presumably by the originating Agency. In the case of the Kennedy Library, McCafferty pointed out that even the White House staff has difficulty in getting access to material, and that the archivist in charge of the Kennedy Library is himself unable to go into certain safes. (He implied CIA might

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have considerable difficulty in gaining access to the sensitive parts of the Kennedy collection.) Meanwhile the current practice is for most White House files to be kept in a central registry, except for those under the charge of Mr. McCafferty. The central registry includes only one type of material of concern to CIA, so far as Mr. McCafferty is aware. This is material on CIA's congressional liaison: for example, the monthly letter and a weekly synopsis of events relating to congressional liaison which CIA used to provide.

5. As for McCafferty's vault, which he showed me, it is a room about 8 x 15 feet which contains four banks of open shelves from the floor almost to the ceiling, all stuffed full, with boxes or other material on top. All this material has every type of classification through SI. Material of higher classification is kept in safes requiring special access and one safe is reserved for material considered extremely sensitive. The only material systematically broken down within a large subject is that dealing with Vietnam. The manner in which material on Vietnam is filed is illustrated by two documents he gave me and which are attached. These files contain, for example, all the assessment reports of the effects of bombing of North Vietnam which were prepared either by OER or by OER and DIA and sent to the White House. As McCafferty flipped through one file for me, the one on attitudes of the North Vietnamese leadership, I noticed papers produced by ONE and OCI, a number of CS reports from FE Division, and a memorandum signed by George Carver, along with other materials from DOD and State produced both here and abroad. It looked as if the files on Vietnam made up about one quarter of the total; McCafferty said that almost everything sent to the White House on Vietnam has been saved with the exception of picture boards and other products of photo reconnaissance.

6. McCafferty believes that only two of the continuing serial products of CIA are present in their entirety: the President's Daily Brief and the Special Daily Report on Vietnam. But the OCI situation reports on past crises are also present; McCafferty showed me two long shelves full of material on the Dominican Republic which he said included the sitreps.* The criterion for preserving these three types of material is that they have been personally seen by the President. This same criterion dictates preservation - and shipment to Austin - of all memoranda from CIA to the President - e.g. the DCI's of 27 March 1967 on the report of the Katzenbach Committee.

* Incidentally, I noticed one folder in the Dominican Republic file labeled with the name of a public opinion poll. Another, which serves to remind us that much of the most sensitive material did not come from the CIA, is labeled 'HELP!' "

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7. Contrary to the impression given to the Office of Security, the file of National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates is not complete: each estimate which has been superseded by a later one is usually destroyed. Other products of ONE are present only if they have been sent to the President personally or are on a subject of particular importance at the moment. I saw several which had buckslips from the DCI to the President.

8. The Current Intelligence Bulletin is generally kept for three months and then returned to CIA.

9. The preservation of White House copies of blue-stripe reports has been very selective. McCafferty estimates that 75% are destroyed and of the remainder only a very small number have been shown to the President. One he remembered, for example, dealt with the speech by Brezhnev on the world situation last Spring. Since the report was long it was necessary to provide a summary, and McCafferty obtained this from CIA. (Incidentally, when he selects such a report for the President to see, he usually asks OCI for a quick analysis of its significance.) We discussed the question of source data in these reports, since whether a given report will be shown to the President depends to a considerable degree on the reliability and importance of the source. Thus some of the blue-stripe reports contain [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I told McCafferty that these summaries must therefore be among the most sensitive material in the White House [REDACTED]

I asked if it would be possible to identify which blue-stripe reports are still in the vault and then if it would be possible to retrieve those of unusual sensitivity for maintenance in CIA custody. McCafferty said he would be willing to check for the presence of individual reports if we provided the date of the report, the date of transmittal, the title, and the country or area. As for retrieving them, he said that any request would have to be made by the DCI to the President.

10. The practice of destroying outdated NIEs and returning outdated CIBs represents almost the only effort of the White House staff to purge the files of old material. McCafferty and his assistant emphasized that they have neither the manpower nor the time to apply any criterion of selectivity to documents in general once they have been put in the vault. The breakdown of Vietnam files into categories and sub-categories, only recently reorganized, is a much more systematic approach than it has been possible to apply to other materials in the vault. Thus what is preserved for posterity reflects to a considerable degree the pressure of workload and lack of opportunity to purge rather than a carefully conceived program of selection for historical purposes.

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11. The quantity of White House material from photo reconnaissance is negligible. McCafferty believes there are no picture boards, and said readout of overhead photography will be present only if it has been transmitted by the DCI or is included in a special report to the President. The quantity of this type of material is exceedingly limited.

12. Of FBIS material the reports on worldwide reactions to such events as the Glassboro meeting and the Russell "Tribunal" are in the White House, but [] are not and neither are the daily reports of FBIS.

13. Material in the White House which came from the National Intelligence Surveys consists of a few sections on Vietnam, perhaps some on the Dominican Republic, and maybe half a dozen other isolated sections.

14. There is practically nothing in the White House from the Foreign Documents Division.

15. Special Briefings provided by CIA are in the White House only if they were provided in written form. Hearings of CIA before committees of Congress are included only if the DCI provided them personally to the President.

16. The following is the situation as McCafferty understands it with respect to material bearing on CIA activities from sources outside the Agency:

a. Papers produced by or for the 303 Committee are not in Walt Rostow's file, and in principle are not considered to be part of the White House collection. They have been returned to [] file after use, and thus even those which are still in the White House can be considered as in the present or eventual custody of CIA. This would be true of the [] Report, for example.

b. Minutes and other documents of the U.S. Intelligence Board are not formally received by the White House. NSC Liaison may send them to Bromley Smith, "who reads them and throws them away". McCafferty can think of no USIB papers in his files.

c. There are no PFIAB papers in the White House files, and McCafferty doubts that any PFIAB papers will be provided to the Austin Library. (We must check this with General Taylor or Pat Coyne.) Special papers such as the reports of the Knox and Eaton Panels went from PFIAB to the White House but were returned to PFIAB.

d. National Security Action Memoranda are published by the White House and will go to Austin.

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e. McCafferty estimates that 98% of the papers produced by the Senior Interdepartmental Group are in the vault, but very few of those produced by the Interdepartmental Regional Groups. There is, of course, IRG material in the files of the individual staff officers in the White House who are members of an IRG. It is not certain whether their files will go to Austin, but the answer is probably yes.

f. It is also not certain whether the files of Dr. Hornig will go to Austin but again the answer is probably yes. This remains to be checked, along with the question of what materials from the DD/S&T may be provided the Library by him or other donors.

g. McCafferty thinks that the entire files of the Warren Commission are in the Kennedy Library, and that nothing affecting the Warren Commission is now in the White House except perhaps in those personal files of McGeorge Bundy which date from the Johnson Administration.

17. From all this it is clear that CIA has already made, willy nilly, a voluminous and important contribution to the Johnson Library. In the next few days I shall circulate some observations on what we can most usefully do to round it out. We ought also to be thinking of a systematic approach to this problem in the next and future administrations, since Presidential Libraries containing everything in the White House vault are clearly here to stay.

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Coordinator,
Johnson Library Project

Attachments: 2 Memos on Vietnam Files

Distribution:

DCI
Ex. Dir.-Compt.
DDP
DDI
DD/S&T
DDS
D/DCI/NIPE
OGC
OLC
D/ONE
D/S
CA Staff
Historical Staff
(Others to be added)

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OUTLINE OF THE VIET NAM FILES

The Viet Nam files are now divided into seven subject sections, plus an eighth section for materials that must be filed by type rather than by subject. Each section is subdivided by folders which pertain to individual topics; there may be only three or four folders to a section, or a dozen or more. This paper gives a description for each of the broad subject sections; for detailed explication of each subdivision (folder), see a longer paper titled "Detailed Description of the Viet Nam Files, As Reorganized Beginning About 1 October 1967".

SECTION 1 - South Viet Nam; Non-Military Activity

Scope: This section pertains to primarily non-violent US and SVN political and economic activity directed toward nation-building.

- A The Situation in South Viet Nam (Weekly)
- B Economic Activity and Planning
- C Revolutionary Development Program
- D Land Reform
- E Post Inaugural Political Activity (1 Nov 67 -)
- EE Post Tet Political Activity (1 Feb 68 -)
- F Inaugural Speeches; Other Commencement Activities (thru Oct '67)
- G Elections (various dates thru Presidential elections)

SECTION 2 - South Viet Nam; Military Activity

Scope: This section covers all military action in SVN from an Allied point of view. Similar material with a VC orientation is in Section 4; NVN-oriented material dealing with infiltration is in Section 3.

- A I Corps and DMZ
- B II Corps (Central SVN)
- BB III Corps
- BC IV Corps
- C General Military Activity
- D Barrier
- E 1965 Troop Decision
- EE Primarily McNamara recommendations re strategic actions, 1965-67
- F Enclave Concept
- G Manpower Mobilization in SVN
- H USG Strategic Reconsiderations After Tet

SECTION 3 - North Viet Nam; All Activity

Scope: This section encompasses all material dealing directly with the North as an aggressor and as a recipient of both punishment and aid.

A Gulf of Tonkin
B Special Daily Report on NVN for the President (CIA)
C NVN Army Infiltration into SVN beginning in 1964
CC NVA Infiltration into SVN beginning 1 April 1968
CD NSA Daily SIGINT Infiltration Summary (DSIS)
D Prisoners of War
E Future Military Operations in Viet Nam
F Memos on Bombing in Viet Nam
G Alternative Bombing Program in NVN
H Appraisal of the Bombing of NVN from CIA and DIA
I Targets
J Bombing Mistakes
K Difficulties in the North
L NVN Leadership Attitudes
M Aid to NVN
N
O
P
Q
R NVN Offensive Air Activity

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SECTION 4 - Viet Cong

Scope: This section contains all materials concerning the Southern insurgents' activities when seen from their point of view.

A NLF Political Programs and Five-Point Stand
B VC Offensive Activity
C VC Recruitment Problems

SECTION 5 - Southeast Asia Allies and Non-Belligerents

Scope: This section pertains to friends and neutrals in SEA, and also includes those who offer aid regardless of where they are.

- A ICC (International Control Commission)
- B Second Asian Summit
- C Asian Statements on US in Southeast Asia
- D Allies: Troop Commitments; Other Aid
- E Cambodia
- EE Laos
- F Seven Nation Conference on Viet Nam (April 20-21, 1967)

SECTION 6 - Peace Seeking

Scope: This section contains all material of whatever origin relating to past, current and future attempts and plans designed to produce negotiations or truce.

- A Bombing Pauses in Viet Nam
- B Peace Initiatives: Miscellaneous 1967 and current, by Country
- C Peace Initiatives: General International Initiatives
- E Bombing Pause Discussion by US (Fall/Winter 1967 -)
- F Holiday Ceasefires, 1967-68
- G Talks with Hanoi, 1967-68

SECTION 7 - Homefront Attitudes and Reporting

Scope: This section includes world as well as US attitudes toward the war and US Asian policy, although primary coverage is of the homefront.

- A Accusations of Pernicious Allied Intent/Atrocity; Public Demons.
- B Legality Considerations
- C Past Presidential Statements of USG Commitment in SEA
- D News Media Coverage of Viet Nam
- E Public Relations Activities; Private Citizen and Group Contacts
- F Congressional Attitudes and Statements (includes other pol. figures)
- G President's San Antonio Speech (29 Sept 1967) and Commentary
- H Veterans' Day 1967
- I Documents Pertinent to the War and Its Genesis

SECTION 8 - Material Filed According to Type

Scope: This section contains miscellaneous material on Viet Nam, such as Situation Room Reports to the President, Bunker's Weekly Report, Lansdale memos, etc..

- 8A Situation Room Reports to the President
- 8B Bunker's Weekly Report to the President
- 8BB Bunker's Weekly Report to the President (~~14-00000~~ Wire Copies)
- 8C Bunker's Press Conference (August 17, 1967)
- 8D Mission Council Action Memos
- 8E LANSDALE Memos to Rostow
- 8F Rostow Briefing Book on Military Situation in South Viet Nam and Negotiations
- 8G Mission Saigon and MACV: Recommendations on Viet Nam
(Long-range; primarily military)
- 8H RAND Study on Possible Deployment of MRBM's to Southeast Asia (October 1965)

Detailed Description of the VIET NAM FILES, as Reorganized Beginning About 1 Oct 67.

This paper is designed to provide the user of the Situation Room Viet Nam files with an explanation of the types of materials to be found in each individual folder. It is also to be used as a guide by those who will be tasked with filing Viet Nam materials.

The files are divided into seven main subject sections, and each section is further broken down by subject subdivisions (folders).

SECTION 1... SOUTH VIET NAM; NON MILITARY ACTIVITY.

Scope: This section pertains to primarily non-violent US and SVN political and economic activity directed toward nation-building.

A. The Situation in South Viet Nam.

This weekly CIA report covers all aspects of the struggle in the South; standard format. These are kept retrospectively for two months, then returned to CIA (except that anything sent to the President is kept regardless of date).

B. Postwar Economic Planning in Viet Nam.

Primarily a large report compiled by Ambassador Leonhart. Includes also some general current material on the SVN economic situation; but routine price quotations and the like are usually cables put in the miscellaneous cables from Saigon. Agriculture is treated as part of the economy.

C. Revolutionary Development Program.

Contains materials related to all non-violent aspects of pacification, except documents solely about land reform, for which there is a separate folder. Some military-oriented reports will be found here, however, if their point of view connotes pacification and anti-VC infrastructure measures rather than enemy destruction as an end in itself. Materials prepared to demonstrate progress in this program are at least partly for public relations purposes and are filed in Section 7.

D. Land Reform in Viet Nam.

Primarily an in-depth report (Mar 67) compiled by Leonhart. Also includes any material solely on land reform.

E. Post Inaugural Political Activity (1 Nov 67 - 1 MAR 68).

SVN internal political and governmental activities and events are filed here, as well as US embassy activity. When military personnel are acting in a political context, information on this will also be here. Additional folders as required will be added forward from this point to provide continuity of coverage of SVN politics.

F. Inaugural Speeches; Other Commencement Activities (thru 31 Oct 67).

Contains all materials concerning the formation and inauguration of the new GVN. Includes all inauguration related information such as the Vice President's visit.

G. Elections (several vols., various dates).

These folders contain all material on the various SVN elections prior to the formation of the new government. Included are such related items as validation problems and Buddhist disruptions.

SECTION 2... SOUTH VIET NAM; MILITARY ACTIVITY.

Scope: This section covers all military action in SVN from an Allied point of view. Similar material with a VC orientation is in section 4; NVN-oriented material dealing with infiltration is in section 3.

A. I Corps and DMZ.

Includes all military operations in and around the DMZ and I Cr6ps -- past, current, and possibilities for the future.

B. II Corps (Central South Viet Nam).

Similar to above. Anything oriented to pacification will be filed in the Revolutionary Development (RD) folder.

C. General Military Activity.

Action that does not pertain to a specific Corps Tactical Zone, or which is not readily identified as such. Also, general statistical studies, such as US casualty reports.

D. Barrier.

Includes all references to the "barrier," even its extension into neutral territory (but non-barrier activity in Laos/Cambodia is filed in section 5).

E. 1965 Troop Decision.

A collection of retrospective material relating to the 1965 troop decision.

F. Enclave Concept.

All material advocating or criticizing adoption of a full or partial "enclave" strategy. Material on Gen. Gavin himself will generally be in section 7.

G. Manpower Mobilization in SVN.

Primarily a Jul 67 report submitted by Eugene Locke. Also any other material specifically about mobilization activity or problems of GVN.

SECTION 3... NORTH VIET NAM; ALL ACTIVITY.

Scope: This section encompasses all material dealing directly with the North as an aggressor and as a recipient of both punishment and aid.

A. Gulf of Tonkin.

Includes various documents of Aug 64 related to the proposal, examination, and passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. There are also comparisons of it with other similar resolutions and a paper discussing the legal basis for the US defense of SVN. More recent material concerns criticism of the President's use of the resolution, and rebuttal of such criticism.

B. Special Daily Report on NVN for the President (CIA; CODEWORD).

This report is in standard format, contains CODEWORD and TK material.

C. NVN Army Infiltration into SVN beginning in 1964.

Contains information on enemy order of battle in the South as well as documentation relating to general infiltration. When material pertains primarily to Laotian routes per se, it is filed in section 5.

add
CC. NVA Infiltration into SVN beginning April 1968

CD. NVA Daily SIGINT Infiltration Summary (1968)

D. Prisoners of War.

Contains material on all POWs and other captives resulting from war in the Viet Nam area (except the Hertz case, for which there is a separate folder).

E. Future Military Operations In Viet Nam.

Includes official and unofficial proposals, requests, and directives related to increasing the military pressure on NVN by various uses of general bombing, threats, and different weapons within the context of limited US objectives. This includes all internal USG discussion of such activity as invasion of NVN, but ascription of such intentions by those outside USG will be filed in section 7. Proposals concerning current bombing practice will not be here.

F. Memos on Bombing in Viet Nam.

General materials on bombing that are not about: specific targets, generalized human and industrial difficulties and deprivations in NVN, or pauses past or future. Reports on general damage to areas are here, but not reports on difficulties arising from such damage.

G. Alternative Bombing Program in NVN.

An old (Jun 67 and earlier) proposal of alternative bombing strategy.

H. Appraisal of the Bombing of NVN from CIA and DIA.

Contains appraisals of bombing effectiveness in formal report form from any USG source, as well as the joint CIA/DIA monthly assessment.

I. Targets.

Materials that are organized to show status of specific targets, rather than general overall effectiveness of bombing. Includes requests for target strikes and the losses incurred as a result of strikes against specified targets.

J. Bombing Mistakes.

Any material which indicates actual US-confirmed bombing mistakes only, such as damage to dikes that was not intentional or attacks on foreign ships. Accusations or accounts by non-USG sources of real or spurious mistakes are to be filed in section 7. Bombing of friendly forces in SVN will be here.

K. Difficulties in the North.

Reports from the scene revealing deprivation and low morale in NVN. Generally, any material showing how the NVN people are being affected by the war, and how they -- as opposed to the leadership -- are reacting.

L. NVN Leadership Attitudes.

Any material which indicates NVN political and military leadership attitudes toward ending or continuing the war, and general strategies they may have developed for furthering those aims.

M. Aid to NVN.

Includes not only actual deliveries of materiel to NVN from whatever source, but also anything which highlights the relations between NVN and those who aid her, except for US sources, which are filed in section 7.

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0012 R. NVN Expansion Air Activity

SECTION 4... VIET CONG.

Scope: This section contains all materials concerning the Southern insurgents' activities when seen from their point of view.

A. NLF Political Programs and 5-point Stand.

Contains information from any source except captured documents about VC political (non-violent) activities and formulations.

B. VC Offensive Activity.

Information about planned or perpetrated VC violence, whether organized on a large scale or as guerrilla terrorism.

C. VC Recruitment Problems.

Documentation of the increasing difficulty in recruitment of VC operatives. Also, in rare instances, any increase in facility of such recruitment.

SECTION 5... SOUTHEAST ASIA ALLIES AND NON BELLIGERENTS.

Scope: This section pertains to friends and neutrals in SEA, and also includes those who offer aid regardless of where they are.

A. ICC (International Control Commission).

Contains all materials pertaining to the Commission and its activities.

B. Second Asian Summit.

Contains all references to this summit meeting from preplanning stages through its direct consequences.

C. Asian Statements on US in Southeast Asia.

Although this folder stresses favorable pronouncements by Asian leaders on the US role in the Pacific community, it also contains statements and attitudes on the part of non-leaders. Most non-favorable criticism will be found in section 3 (Aid to NVN).

D. Allies: Troop Commitments, Other Aid.

Stresses the continuing search for greater Allied combat participation, but also covers all other forms of aid to SVN and the US, and other items of interest related to the Allied presence in Viet Nam.

E. Cambodia, Laos.

Documents relating to the two major "non belligerents" of the war are found here whenever there is a Vietnamese orientation, whether military or political.

F. Seven Nation Conference on Viet Nam (April 20-21, 1967).

All material coming out of or relating to this Ambassadorial-level meeting of Allies.

SECTION 6... PEACE SEEKING.

Scope: This section contains all material of whatever origin relating to past, current, and future attempts and plans designed to produce negotiations or truce.

A. Bombing Pauses in Viet Nam.

Contains objective information about past pauses only.

B. Peace Initiatives: Miscellaneous 1967 and Current, by Country of Origin.

While excluding the older but still active code named initiatives, this folder catches the latest attempts at peace, except for USG internal discussion of its own initiatives, such as a bombing cessation.

C. Peace Initiatives: [REDACTED] 25X1
Group), General International Initiatives.

D. Peace Initiatives: [REDACTED]

etc.), [REDACTED]

This title is self-explanatory.

E. Bombing Pause Discussion by US (Fall/Winter 1967-).
High level internal consideration of initiating a cessation of bombing in the hope of stimulating negotiations and/or in response to pressure.

F. Holiday Ceasefires - 1967.

Contains references to such standowns in their most limited sense. Any talk of extension of a holiday ceasefire, or any actual such occurrence will be in the preceding folder.

SECTION 7... HOMEFRONT ATTITUDES AND REPORTING.

Scope: This section includes world as well as US attitudes toward the war and US Asian policy, although primary coverage is of the homefront.

A. Accusations of Pernicious Allied Intent and/or Atrocity. Public Demonstration
A wide range of materials which generally denote internal or foreign activity designed to pressure the US to withdraw from SVN. Also included are official foreign or domestic fears of currently unlikely acts of escalation; atrocity stories; antiwar movement activity.

B. Legality Considerations.

This folder is concerned primarily with legal justification for the conduct of the war, from a White House point of view. Other folders^{exist} which touch upon the legality question from other points of view or in other contexts deal with such subjects as the Tonkin Gulf Resolution (section 3) and Congressional criticism of the war on a legal basis.

C. Past Presidential Statements of USG Commitment in Southeast Asia.
The focus here is on statements and actions by Eisenhower and Kennedy during their Administrations. Includes compilations of excerpts from speeches, memoranda of conversations, official pronouncements. May also include current expressions by ex-Presidents, and LBJ items from Kennedy days.

D. News Media Coverage of Viet Nam.

Designed to provide instances of independent press, TV, etc., treatment of the Viet Nam situation, which may demonstrate different levels of responsibility. Some USG press contacts are here, but only when they are for the purpose of explanation of prior press coverage of an event or situation. USG-initiated contacts for the purpose of answering questions or providing information to stimulate certain coverages are found in the next folder.

E. Public Relations Activities; Private Citizen and Group Contacts.

All material covering USG efforts to stimulate favorable commentary and support for US policy in Southeast Asia, as well as to inform the public of the actual extent of progress there.

F. Congressional Attitudes and Statements (Includes Other Political Figures).
Covers wide range of sentiment expressed by political, governmental, and

other prominent private citizens. Mostly adverse criticism, but some speeches of support will be found.

G. President's San Antonio Speech (29 Sep 67) and Commentary. Contains prior and final drafts, pro and con reactions from any source (except Hanoi, which is in section 3- NVN Leadership Attitudes).

H. Veterans' Day 1967.

Speeches and other material related to the President's trip.

all 7 I. Documents Pertinent to the War and its Genesis

SECTION 8... is comprised of folders which allow for filing material according to type. For example, there are folders for Situation Room Reports and for Bunker's weekly letter. Formerly, many documents were filed as "Miscellaneous Memos" and "Memos to the President," regardless of their subject content. These folders still exist with their old material, but now only the most generalized and truly miscellaneous types of document will be found here. Also formerly, Saigon cables were all filed together numerically regardless of subject; now they are placed in appropriate subject folders, but are cross referenced by number on a separate chart. The folder for current Saigon cables contains only those for which there is no appropriate subject folder.

H.

B.